Firing up the base: The effect of party system polarisation on positive and negative partisanship in Europe between 1999-2019

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


Top-down explanations of partisanship change

• Previous work:

The more differentiated parties' ideological stances on the Left-Right dimension, the stronger *Positive* Partisanship (Lupu 2015, Vegetti 2015)

- ! Neglect of negativity (But see Anderson *et al.* 2022)
- ! **Multidimensional policy space** (But see Dassonneville *et al.* 2022)




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Negative Partisanship (NP):

Perennial debate in partisanship literature ==> Stability

- Commonly defined in affective and emotional terms: Repulsion from a party, "animadversion", "systematic rejection" = Never vote for
- Instrumental/Rational? Some evidence pointing to the role of ideology (E.g. McGregor *et al.* 2015)
- "A power of its own" on electoral behaviour (Medeiros *et al.* 2014; Mayer 2014)

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Descriptive analysis

Results and Discussion

Effect of polarisation

- H1: An increase in LR (economic) polarisation will lead to an increase in Positive Partisanship
- H2: An increase in LR (economic) polarisation will lead to an increase in Negative Partisanship
- H3: An increase in GALTAN (cultural) polarisation will lead to an increase in Positive Partisanship
- H4: An increase in GALTAN (cultural) polarisation will lead to an increase in Negative Partisanship

 $\underset{0000}{\text{Descriptive analysis}}$

Results and Discussion

Data and methods

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- Voter-level data from European Election Studies (EES) 1999-2019 (5 waves)
- 27 European countries (CEE and WE), 108 election-year, 83,889 respondents
- Party-level data from Chapel Hill Expert Surveys and Parlgov
- EES-CHES pairing strategy: Closest ($\Delta 2years$)

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Data and methods (cntd)

Negative Partisanship (DV)

- Aversion to a party one would never vote for
- Respondent coded 1 if at least one NP
- Propensity To Vote (PTV): "How probable is it that you will ever vote for the following parties? (0-10)"
- Classification strategy

PTV = 0

Party won at least 1 seat in last GE

Party competes nationally (e.g. excludes SNP)

Positive Partisanship (DV)

• Dichotomous variable (complete answers to strength and direction questions)

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Data and methods (ctnd 2)

Party system Polarisation (IV)

Party system polarisation
 Ideological distance between parties on GALTAN (cultural) and
 LR (Econ.) dimensions
 Dalton's index of polarisation based on CHES data:

$$Pola_{dim} = \sqrt{\sum_{j=1}^{n} \omega_j \frac{(p_j - \bar{p})^2}{5}}$$

Data and Methods (ctnd 3)

Control variables

- Individual-level (level-1)
 Socio-economic (age, age stop study, gender)
 Interest in politics
 Ideological extremism
- Country-year level (Level-2)
 Party system polarisation (Economic and cultural)
 Effective N parties (N parties evaluated)
 Time since last GE (in months)
 Western European country

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Control variables


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Theoretical framework

Research design

Results and Discussion

Party system polarisation in Europe between 1999-2019



Kévin Saudé (UL)


Firing up the base - EPOP 2022

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
Results and Discussion

Positive Partisanship Europe between 1999-2019




Results and Discussion

Where is the hate? Measuring NP from PTV



The direction of Negative Partisanship among Greens (left) and Far-right (right) Positive Partisans

Scatter plot of the share of NPs in each election-year diad by polarisation




	Dependent variable:				
	Positive Partisanship	Negative Partisanship			
GALTAN Polarisation	0.184** (0.059)	-0.030 (0.050)			
LR Econ Polarisation	0.163* (0.076)	0.115* (0.057)			
Age	0.094*** (0.005)	0.136*** (0.005)			
Gender (Female)	-0.055*** (0.016)	0.060*** (0.017)			
Political interest	1.269*** (0.023)	0.275*** (0.026)			
Age left education	-0.075*** (0.020)	0.082*** (0.022)			
Ideological extremism (LR)	0.272*** (0.005)	0.217*** (0.006)			
Effective N parties	0.134** (0.048)				
Positive Partisanship		0.091*** (0.019)			
Time since GE (months)	0.021 (0.046)	0.011 (0.039)			
WE country	0.130 (0.198)	0.014 (0.164)			
N Eval. parties		0.107** (0.034)			
VAR election	0.274	0.206			
VAR Country	0.151	0.105			
N elections	108	108			
N Countries	27	27			
Observations	83,889	81,903			
Noto:	*				

Note:

*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001


Descriptive analysis

Effect of party system polarisation on Positive Partisanship



Descriptive analysis


Effect of party system polarisation on Negative Partisanship



Descriptive analysis

Results and Discussion

Hypotheses



Conclusions

- Negative Partisanship seems more stable than Positive Partisanship
- Cultural polarisation (GALTAN) generates more partisan electorates
- Surprisingly no evidence of increased NP in culturally polarised elections
- Is NP better understood in terms of directional, rather than proximity electoral behaviour?

Descriptive analysis

Results and Discussion

Research agenda

• Replicate analysis using panel data

- Interplay between Positive and Negative Partisanship?
 Partisanship typology (Rose and Mischler 1998)
 E.g. closed partisans: GAL partisans vs TAN Partisans
- Is Negative Partisanship identity-based?
 Does polarisation lead to more expressive behaviour (Loyal voting, turnout)?

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Results and Discussion

Summary statistics


Table: Summary Statistics

Statistic	Ν	Mean	St. Dev.	Min	Max
Dalton Econ.	109, 534	-0.00	1.00	-3.90	1.75
Dalton GALTAN	109, 534	-0.00	1.17	-3.12	3.80
Age	108,908	-0.00	1.68	-3.82	5.36
Time since last GE	109, 534	-0.00	1.28	-2.47	2.63
Extremism	93, 419	-0.00	1.57	-2.72	4.25
ENP	109, 534	-0.00	1.54	-2.84	4.05
N eval. parties	109, 534	0.00	1.68	-4.47	6.53

Descriptive analysis


Results and Discussion

Typology of Partisanship in Western Europe



Descriptive analysis

Typology of Partisanship in Central and Eastern Europe



Year